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Union Held Liable in Contribution to Employer 
for Title VII Violations: Glus u. G.C. Murphy 
Co. 
The issue of contribution between joint tortfeasors has per- 
plexed the federal judiciary for years.' A number of federal 
courts have allowed a right of contribution in federal law 
claims," but others have held that "no federal common law right 
of contribution e~ists."~ Recently the controversy caused a split 
in the circuit courts over contribution in antitrust suits.* In title 
VII actions, several federal courts have held employers and un- 
ions jointly liable for back pay and attorneys' fees,' but prior to 
Glus v. G.C. Murphy CO.~  only one court had ruled directly on 
~ontribution.~ The Third Circuit's holding in Glus that a federal 
1. The federal common law rule denying contribution was first established by the 
Supreme Court in Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905). 
In an admiralty case almost fifty years later, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & 
Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), the Court again denied a contribution claim stating 
that "[iln the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have 
generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create an enforceable right of 
contribution as between joint tortfeasors." Id. at  285. For many years federal courts re- 
lied on this language to deny claims for contribution brought under federal law. See, e.g., 
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616-17 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1960) (antitrust law). Not 
until the Supreme Court's dictum in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 
U.S. 106 (1974), over twenty years after Halcyon, did the apparent federal common law 
ban on contribution begin to weaken. In Cooper Stevedoring, the Court stated that 
"Halcyon stands for a more limited rule than the absolute bar against contribution 
. . . ," explaining that under the facts of Halcyon contribution was inconsistent with the 
Harbor Workers Act. Id. at 111. 
2. E.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 
1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (antitrust law); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (aviation law). 
3. DiBenedetto v. United States, 35 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d 75-1502, 75-1504 (D.R.I. 
1974). See also Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 
1339, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
4. Compare Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (allowed contribution), with Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979) (denied contribution) and Wil- 
son P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tesas Indus. Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979) (denied 
contribution). 
5. E.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Note, Union Lia- 
bility Under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68 GEO. L.J. 959 (1980). 
6. 629 F.2d 248 (1980). 
7. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5591 
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common law right of contribution exists under title VII, is one of 
the most significant developments in the area to date. 
In 1971 a class action was brought on behalf of all women 
employed by the G.C. Murphy Company (Murphy) from July 
1965 to January 1971.' Named as defendants were Murphy, the 
International Union of Wholesale and Department Store Union, 
the AFL-CIO (the International) and two local unions? The 
plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Murphy and the unions had 
violated title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641° and the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963" by entering into and maintaining a discrimina- 
tory collective bargaining agreement." Murphy filed a cross 
claim against the unions asserting that they were solely responsi- 
ble for the alleged sex discrimination and claiming a right to 
contribution if it were found liable. Before trial Murphy settled 
with the plaintiff class for a sum of $648,000.13 Murphy contin- 
ued to press for contribution from the unions and settled with 
one local for $4,146.14 Trial proceeded on Murphy's claim 
against the other two unions. 
At trial, the district court concluded that Murphy and the 
defendant unions had violated title VII? The court held that 
they were equally liable for the discrimination and thus equally 
(D.D.C. 1977), revJd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 
U.S. 902 (1980). The district court granted contribution as a matter of policy, citing 
deterrence and equitable considerations as reasons for doing so. 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. at  
5596. The court did refer to cases where other federal courts had confronted the issue of 
contribution. However, these cases ruled on contribution on procedural pounds only. Id. 
at 5595. See Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. 
Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 
267 (E.D. Va. 1973), affJd 519 F.2d 661 (1975), reuJd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 
(1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977); Osborne v. McCall Printing Co., 4 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 276 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49 
F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ga. 1970). These cases only confront the issue of whether contribution 
can be brought as a cross claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13 and 14 since 
the contribution issue was dependent upon an adjudication of a third party's liability. 
8. 629 F.2d at 250. 
9. The two local unions were the Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union, 
Local 940, and the Teamster's Local 249. Id. 
10. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e (1976). 
11. 29 U.S.C. 3 206 (1976). 
12. The collective bargaining agreement provided for separate job classifications, 
pay scales, and seniority systems for Murphy's male and female employees. 629 F.2d at  
250. 
13. The settlement provided for payment of $548,000 in damages and $100,000 in 
attorneys' fees; $100,000 of the $548,000 was allocated to the Equal Pay Act charge. Id. 
14. TGs figure represented the total amount in Local 940's treasury. Id. 
15. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., Civ. No. 71-264 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1976). 
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responsible for the plaintiffs' financial losses.16 The district court 
divided the damages among the defendants and entered judg- 
ment against the International setting its share of the damages 
at $242,337.17 
The International appealed from that judgment, asserting 
that the district court did not have jurisdiction over it under 
title VII because the International had not been named in the 
complaint filed by the plaintiffs with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It also contended that no 
right of contribution could be claimed for violations of title VII 
or the Equal Pay Act. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that 
Murphy had no right of contribution against the International 
under the Equal Pay Act:' but remanded for further proceed- 
ings on the issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction 
under title V I P  
On remand, the district court found that the plaintiffs had 
not named the International in the EEOC complaint, but held 
that the ommission did not defeat jurisdi~tion.~~ The Interna- 
tional appealed for a second time, challenging the district court's 
conclusion on jurisdiction and its decision on the right of contri- 
bution under title VII. In this latest appeal, Murphy argued that 
the district court did not properly calculate the amount due 
under the right of contribution. 
In reaching ita decision in Glus, the Third Circuit relied on 
Supreme Courts1 and recent federal circuit court caseP to find 
that a right of contribution exists in the federal common law, 
and stated that "fundamental fairness demands a sharing of the 
liability."as The court noted that even though no right of contri- 
bution is expressly provided for in title VII and that nothing in 
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended for such 
16. 629 F.2d at  251. 
17. Id. 
18. Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889,894 (3d Cir. 1977). The court found 
no evidence of congressional intent to make a union liable to an employee or an em- 
ployer for a violation of the Equal Pay Act and thus could not allow contribution with- 
out holding the union jointly liable. Id. 
19. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1977). 
20. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., Civ. No. 71-264 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1979). 
21. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952) and 
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). 
22. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 
(8th Cir. 1979) and Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). 
23. 629 F.2d at  252. 
6961 CASENOTES 699 
a right to exist, several title VII policy goals would be achieved 
by allowing contribution in this case. First, the express terms of 
title VII demonstrate a congressional intent to hold both unions 
and employers financially liable for unlawful employment prac- 
tices. The court explained that a denial of contribution in these 
cases would wrongfully release some individuals from liability? 
Secondly, a right of contribution would encourage conciliation 
and settlement of claims. The court determined that "[ilf Mur- 
phy had felt that it had no right of contribution against the un- 
ions it might have been unwilling to reach a settlement . . . 
choos[ing] instead to proceed with the litigation so that the un- 
ions would be held responsible for a share of the damages."as 
Finally, the majority concluded that by allowing contribution 
" '[bloth union and employer will know that they both must be 
vigilant to eschew unlawful discrimination.' The court ac- 
knowledged that there were arguments on both sides of the issue 
and that the policy choice was a difficult one, but rejected the 
argument that it was usurping legislative power by deciding the 
issue in favor of contribution. 
Circuit Judge Sloviter, in a vigorous dissent, argued that the 
majority misinterpreted the relevant precedents in its determi- 
nation that a right of contribution exists under federal common 
law? He further took issue with the majority's willingness to fill 
in what it termed the "statutory interstices of Title VII."a8 He 
contended that the facts before the court were not analogous to 
those in contexts where the Supreme Court had fashioned a 
common law cause of action.40 He then referred to the numerous 
administrative and policy issues raised by the court's holding 
and recommended that Congress consider changing the current 
rule.80 
In spite of the court's attempt to limit the decision to its 
facts and its failure to adequately treat all of the pertinent is- 
sues, Glus represents a welcome extension of the right of contri- 
bution to defendants in title VII cases. This case note will ana- 
24. Id. at 256. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Worker's Union, 14 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. 5591, 5596 (D.D.C. 1977), reu'd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. granted, 445 US. 902 (1980)). 
27. Id. at 260 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
28. Id. at 263-68. 
29. Id. at 260-63. 
30. Id. at 268. 
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lyze the court's reasoning and the potential impact of its holding 
on title VII actions. 
The Third Circuit exercised considerable judicial leverage 
when it allowed a cause of action for contribution based on "the 
interstices of Title VII." The court began its analysis by assert- 
ing that because no right of contribution is provided for in title 
VII, the drafters of the legislation may not have considered it? 
However, the absence of a right of contribution in the statute 
equally raises an inference of congressional intent that such a 
right should not be allowed. Apart from the statute's language, 
the legislative history of title VII is, as the court acknowledged," 
silent on the subject of contribution. However, title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted during a period when the 
federal courts consistently denied contribution under federal 
common law? Also, at about the time title VII was enacted, the 
Supreme Court made it clear in Halcyon Lines u. Haenn Ship 
Ceiling & Refitting Corp. that the creation of an enforceable 
right of contribution under the federal law generally requires 
legislation." For example, in the Securities Act of 1933,'6 Con- 
gress explicitly provided for contribution. Thus, even though the 
Glus court mentioned congressional intent in its analysis, a right 
of contribution under title VII cannot be based on real evidence 
of congressional intent or lack thereof. 
The Glw court cited several Supreme Court cases as sup- 
port for its holding, but these cases dealt with situations where 
no statute applied to the facts:@ no specific remedies were 
provied by statute:7 or no private cause of action existed for an 
individual harmed by the statutory violation." None of the cases 
31. Id. at 253 (majority opinion). 
32. Id. at  255. 
33. See, e-g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 224 
(1905). 
34. 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952). 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976). 
36. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Supreme Court estab- 
lished a federal common law action of nuisance. Although Congress had enacted laws in 
this area, such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 5 1, 62 Stat. 1155 
(1948), no federal statute granted the remedy sought, which was the abatement of the 
pollution of Lake Michigan. 
37. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Court ad- 
dressed itself to the task of fashioning a common law action under the Labor Manage- 
ment Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The statute "expressly fur- 
nished some substantive law," 353 U.S. a t  457, but failed to provide express sanctions 
and remedies for its enforcement. 
38. In Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the Supreme Court created 
6961 CASENOTES 701 
cited provided precedent for creating an equitable remedy, such 
as contribution, for a defendant when the governing statute was 
silent on the matter. They were all cases in which the plaintiffs 
were seeking a common law remedy for a harm done when no 
federal statutory provision explicitly provided one. By contrast, 
in Glus Murphy was seeking only to lessen its total liability for 
damages despite title VII's express provision that it should bear 
the full burden. 
Whether the Third Circuit's extension of the right to contri- 
bution is justified by Supreme Court case law or as a "statutory 
interstice" is certainly debatable. However, the court justified its 
extension of the rule on other grounds as well. The court implied 
that there is a trend toward allowing contribution in state and 
federal courtss9 and concluded that to deny such a right in this 
case would be inequitable." Although the court's action may be 
justifiable on equity grounds, this alone does not adequately jus- 
tify the judicial creation of a right of contribution under title 
VII. The lack of real congressional or judicial support for the 
Third Circuit's new rule in Glus is troubling. 
Despite the fact that the Third Circuit alluded to a general 
right of contribution throughout the opinion, the Glus holding is 
expressly limited to its facts. The court held that contribution 
will be allowed in the unique case where one defendant settles 
for the entire amount of damages before trial and requests con- 
tribution from non-settling co-defendants who are jointly lia- 
ble." The Third Circuit may have felt compelled to narrowly 
define the Glus holding for several reasons. First, a case with 
similar facts and the same issue now is scheduled for review by 
the Supreme Court." Secondly, although there is a trend in the 
a private cause of action for an individual who was harmed by the violation of a federal 
statute. The statute required that certain safety devices be installed on trains, but it did 
not provide a remedy for persons harmed because of failure to properly install such 
devices. 
39. 629 F.2d at 252-53. 
40. Prosser reasons: 
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the en- 
tire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally 
responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a 
successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's 
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer . . . . 
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS 5 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971). 
41. 629 F.2d at 257. 
42. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5591 
(D.D.C. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 
702 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
federal courts toward allowing contribution in other areas, no 
substantial precedent exists for granting contribution under title 
VII." Finally, a narrow holding minimizes the number of policy 
considerations associated with contribution beyond this set of 
facts." Nevertheless, even though this narrow holding pertains 
directly to the Glus facts and thereby limits the Glus holding's 
future application, the court's reasoning can be read to suggest 
that the right of contribution should be much more in~lusive.~~ 
A broad reading of the court's rationale indicates that the 
court would have granted contribution in all cases where one de- 
fendant had paid more than its share of the damages." Yet, the 
court failed to address the pertinent issues raised by this exten- 
sion of the right of contribution. For example, the court in Glus 
allowed contribution when a defendant paid a complete pre-trial 
settlement, but the court did not specifically rule that it would 
allow contribution when a defendant pays the full amount of 
damages resulting from a trial judgment. Also, a defendant 
might settle with the plaintiff for more than his share of the 
damages but less than the full amount. Here the question of 
whether the defendant can still receive contribution is left unan- 
swered. Finally, in a situation where a defendant settled for less 
than his share, the court did not decide whether he could be 
required to contribute the difference to a co-defendant. Com- 
mentators have suggested that contribution be allowed in all cir- 
cumstances but the last," since no defendant would want to set- 
tle if he were to find himself still liable for damages at trial." 
The court also failed to consider how monetary responsibil- - 
ity should be allocated among defendants-whether by pro-rata 
share, comparative fault, or some other method? Nor did the 
US. 902 (1980). 
43. See note 1, 2 & 4 and accompanying text supra. 
44. 629 F.2d at 267-68 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
45. See id. at  255-57 (majority opinion). 
46. Id. 
47. See generally Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions 
under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 S.W.L.J. 779,779-90 (1979); Comment, Contribu- 
tion Among Antitrust Defendants, 33 VAND. L. REV. 979, 981-82 (1979); Sellers, Contri- 
bution in Antitrust Damuge Actions, 24 VILL. L. REV. 829, 843-48 (1979). 
48. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 
1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
49. For a general treatment of how the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors 
Acts of 1939 and 1955 divided damages among defendants, and for a unique proposition 
regarding division of liability called the "pro-rata reduction rule," see 18 STAN. L. REV. 
486 (1966). 
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court address the issue of intent. Traditionally, the right of con- 
tribution has been denied to willful wrongdoers." Since the vio- 
lation in Glus was intentional, the court sidestepped a crucial 
issue. The court's failure to address these issues weakens the 
holding and undercuts the case's precedential value. 
Despite the questions left unanswered by the Glus holding, 
the remedy it provides is welcome. Because a defendant who set- 
tled had no guarantee of contribution from nonsettling co-defen- 
dants, before Glus a defendant was less likely to settle with the 
plaintiff for what might turn out to be more than his share of 
the damages. A right of contribution gives the defendant re- 
course under those circumstances and therefore encourages set- 
tlement. It affords plaintiffs a greater opportunity to receive the 
full amount of damages and provides an equitable sharing of the 
burden by defendants who are jointly liable. It helps eliminate 
the possibility of a plaintiff being unjustly enriched through col- 
lusion with one of several defendants." A right of contribution 
also prevents unjustified settlements where the plaintiff threat- 
ens a defendant that suit will be brought against him only." If 
the Glus decision is followed, it will afford an opportunity for 
more open, efficient, and perhaps expeditious conciliation be- 
tween plaintiffs and defendants. 
Furthermore, a right of contribution may deter future viola- 
tions of title VII. Some controversy exists over whether contri- 
bution enhances or diminishes a statute's deterrent effect.ss The 
arguments for both positions are often based on business eco- 
nomics. An example is whether the smaller chance of paying all 
the damages is a greater deterrent than a larger chance of pay- 
ing only a proportion. Without a right of contribution, a poten- 
tial title VII violator gambles on the plaintiffs choice of whom 
to sue. On the other hand, with a right of contribution, a defen- 
dant knows that he must pay either way if caught. Indeed it may 
be asked whether a right of contribution will really make a dif- 
50. See W. PROSSER, supra note 40, 5 50, at 306 & nn.41, 42, 45 & 46. 
51. See 18 STAN. L. REV. 486, 490 (1966). 
52. Id. 
53. See Comment, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HAW. L. REV. 
1540, 1544-48 (1980); Comment, Contribution in Pn'uate Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. 
REV. 682, 702-03 (1978). See also S. REP. NO. 428,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979) (Report 
on S. 1468, Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979). The Northwest Airlines u. Trans- 
port Workers Union case also deals with this issue. 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5591, 5596 
(D.D.C. 1977), reu'd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 
U.S. 902 (1980). 
704 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
ference. It has not been shown that employers or unions even 
consider what might happen if they are found in violation of ti- 
tle VII. Nonetheless, the possibility of escaping all liability when 
no right of contribution exists may cause many to be more will- 
ing to engage in unlawful discrimination." This argument, com- 
bined with contribution's equitable logic, is most persuasive." 
On balance, the arguments in favor of a right of contribu- 
tion outweigh the disadvantages and overcome the weaknesses 
in the Glus court's reasoning. When viewed in this light Glus 
represents a substantial step forward in contribution law under 
title VII. Yet, more judicial development and refining is neces- 
sary to establish a uniform rule applicable to all title VII joint 
liability cases. 
J. David Gowdy 
54. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 
1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1979). 
55. The Supreme Court stated in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke Inc. that 
"where two parties 'are both in fault, they should bear the damage equally, to make 
them more careful.' " 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974) (quoting The Alabama, 92 US. 695, 697 
(1876)). 
